Updated Q3 2026 by CT Acquisitions.

M&A advisor for marine construction

Choosing an M&A advisor for marine construction is not the same as choosing a generic business broker. Marine construction sits at the intersection of federal contracting, Jones Act vessel compliance, Army Corps of Engineers prequalification, coastal permitting, and heavy equipment intensity, and each of those axes is worth a full turn of EBITDA at exit if underwritten correctly. This 2026 guide walks lower middle market marine construction owners with $1M to $25M of EBITDA through what a specialist advisor actually does, what multiples PE platforms and strategic acquirers are paying today, and how CT Acquisitions runs both sell-side sale processes and buy-side add-on searches inside this vertical.

The guide is written for two audiences in one document. The first is the founder who has been swinging pile hammers for 25 years and is starting to think about exit, either because the next generation is not stepping in or because the check size PE is now writing has become too big to ignore. The second is the strategic acquirer or private equity platform hunting marine construction add-ons in a market where Cerberus Maritime, Saltchuk Resources, Wynnchurch Capital, and New Mountain Capital have each printed a nine-figure or larger check in the last twelve months.

What does a marine construction M&A advisor actually do?

An M&A advisor for marine construction runs the full sell-side process: quality of earnings preparation, EBITDA normalization for owner add-backs and one-time bid losses, marketing to named buyers such as Cerberus Maritime and Orion Group, LOI negotiation, and coordination through USACE prequalification transfer and Jones Act vessel diligence. In LMM marine construction, the advisor is also managing bonding line assumption, retainage true-up, and warranty reserve negotiation, none of which a generic broker would understand at the level required to close a $60M deal like Orion Group / J.E. McAmis.

The mechanical work is a small fraction of what a good advisor actually does. The larger job is judgment work: which of the roughly 40 credible buyers for a $5M EBITDA marine construction platform should see the book, in what order, and with what pre-marketing conversations. A generalist broker will run a listing service auction and hope. A specialist runs a curated process against a target list built from USACE prequalified contractor rolls, state marine class license registries, and the private equity platforms that have publicly disclosed a marine or infrastructure services thesis. That difference is often two full turns of EBITDA at close.

Advisor work spans preparation, marketing, negotiation, and closing, and the specialist version of each phase looks materially different in marine construction than it does in a generalist LMM engagement. Preparation includes not only QoE but a bonding capacity review, an EMR history reconciliation, and a review of every open USACE Section 10 and Section 404 permit. Marketing includes founder-to-founder outreach with named platform CEOs, not blast email. Negotiation includes vessel-by-vessel Jones Act documentation review, and closing coordinates prequalification transfer with state DOT offices in every state where the seller performs work.

An advisor is also the market intelligence source. In 2026, that means knowing that Bochi acquired Diversified Marine in 2025 out of the WorkBoat deal announcement flow, that Geo-Management Construction Partners acquired Baltimore Pile Driving and Marine Construction in October 2024 via Tower Partners, and that Wynnchurch Capital paid $450M for Arcosa Marine Products in Q1 2026 per Arcosa’s 8-K. That comp set is the foundation for any credible valuation range, and no generic advisor is going to bring it to the table.

Why do marine construction owners need a specialized M&A advisor?

Marine construction has vertical-specific mechanics that a generalist advisor would not price correctly: USACE prequalification value, Jones Act vessel documentation risk, state marine contractor licensing that does not transfer automatically, and bonded backlog as a bounded ceiling on both value and buyer universe. A specialist priced Orion Group’s J.E. McAmis acquisition in February 2026 at approximately $60M including a $12M subordinated note and $2M in stock, per Orion’s 8-K; that structure exists because a specialist understood how to sequence federal contract novation against payment timing.

The list of things a generalist advisor would miss on a marine construction sale is long and expensive. They would not know that Great Lakes Dredge and Dock’s April 2026 take-private at $17 per share cash by Saltchuk Resources reset the ceiling for what an infrastructure-services strategic will pay for scale. They would not know that Cerberus Maritime launched in August 2025 with HD Hyundai and Korea Development Bank and is currently the highest-conviction PE buyer of maritime assets in the country. And they would not know that New Mountain Capital’s $5.5B continuation vehicle on Azuria plus Inframark in April 2026 is the largest infra-services CV to date and signals that the funds behind marine platforms would keep the platforms longer than the standard five-year window.

The generalist would also mispreflight the seller. Marine construction sellers typically have between 15% and 30% of trailing twelve months revenue tied up in retainage that a naive working capital peg would treat as cash. The generalist would surrender that value at close. A specialist would carve retainage out of the peg entirely, land the buyer on a bounded working capital target, and preserve seven-figure value for the founder. That single move on a $30M enterprise value deal has moved cash-at-close by $2M to $4M in multiple 2025 and 2026 CT Acquisitions engagements.

A specialist advisor also owns the buyer universe. There are perhaps 30 to 40 credible buyers for a $5M EBITDA marine construction platform at $30M to $50M enterprise value in 2026, and the specialist has spoken to each of them within the last six months. That list would include the four named platforms above plus Weeks Marine, Kiewit Infrastructure, Manson Construction, and roughly two dozen PE-backed platforms rolling up adjacent trades. No generalist would surface that universe in the compressed timeline a well-run process demands.

In our experience advising marine construction owners, the single largest value gap between a specialist-run and a generalist-run process is not the multiple applied. It is the definition of EBITDA that gets to the multiple. Marine construction P&L is riddled with legitimate add-backs that a generalist would either miss or fail to defend: owner-managed sub crews reclassified as third-party costs, one-time mobilization losses on federal jobs, retainage-driven revenue smoothing, and warranty reserves that overprovision for pile-driving callback risk. Getting normalized EBITDA right on a $5M number is worth roughly $2.5M to $5M of enterprise value at typical 2026 multiples, and no generalist advisor we have ever competed against has done that work correctly on a marine construction seller’s book.

What EBITDA multiples are marine construction businesses selling for in 2026?

2026 marine construction EBITDA multiples run from 2.5x to 3.5x SDE at the sub-$500K owner-operator level up to 7.5x to 9.5x on $10M-plus platforms with USACE prequalification and Jones Act tonnage. Capstone Partners’ August 2025 construction services report shows PE-paid multiples averaged 10.6x versus strategic-paid 7.5x, with the delta driven by consolidation arbitrage. Wynnchurch’s $450M acquisition of Arcosa Marine Products in Q1 2026 anchored the top of the range for adjacent marine manufacturing at approximately 10x.

Size band	Multiple range	Typical buyer	Structure notes
<$500K SDE	2.5x-3.5x SDE (asset sale)	Owner-operator, family, or one-off strategic	Almost always asset sale with SBA 7(a) financing; excludes equipment financed separately
$500K-$1M EBITDA	3.5x-4.5x	Regional strategic, search fund	Seller note commonly 10-20% of price; earnout on 12-24 month project pipeline
$1M-$3M EBITDA	4.0x-5.5x	Independent sponsor, small PE platform	Rollover equity 10-25%; retainage carved from working capital peg
$3M-$10M EBITDA	5.5x-7.5x	PE platform add-on, strategic tuck-in	Cash at close 70-85%; two-way earnout on federal backlog conversion
$10M+ EBITDA	7.5x-9.5x (10x+ on tier-one)	PE platform, public strategic (Orion, GLDD, Kiewit)	All-cash preferred; management rollover 15-30%; MIP for tier-two operators
$25M+ EBITDA (rare)	9x-11x	Mega-cap PE (Cerberus Maritime, New Mountain), public roll-up	Take-private structure; continuation vehicle possible; sponsor-to-sponsor exit

The single largest driver of where a business would land inside its size band is federal exposure and prequalification depth. A $5M EBITDA marine construction business with 60% federal revenue, USACE prequalification held by three qualifying individuals, an EMR of 0.72, and a Jones Act-compliant crane barge fleet would typically clear the top of the 5.5x to 7.5x band and sometimes push into the 8x range on a strategic bid. The same $5M EBITDA business with 100% private waterfront revenue, no USACE prequalification, and 90% rented equipment would clear the bottom of the band at 5.5x, often lower.

Recent public and semi-public comps from 2024 to 2026 support this framing. Orion Group’s $60M acquisition of J.E. McAmis and JEM Marine Leasing in February 2026 valued the target at what would be a mid-to-high single-digit multiple given the disclosed $1.4B pipeline addition, per Orion’s 8-K. Great Lakes Dredge and Dock’s take-private at $1.5B EV / $17 per share cash by Saltchuk represented approximately 8.5x to 9x trailing EBITDA per the GLDD proxy, and Wynnchurch’s $450M cash purchase of Arcosa Marine Products at Q1 2026 came in around 10x per Arcosa’s 8-K and coverage in WorkBoat.

Which PE platforms are actively acquiring marine construction right now?

The four highest-conviction PE platforms in US marine construction as of Q3 2026 are Cerberus Maritime, Saltchuk Resources, Wynnchurch Capital, and New Mountain Capital. Cerberus launched Cerberus Maritime in August 2025 with HD Hyundai and Korea Development Bank; Saltchuk took Great Lakes Dredge and Dock private in April 2026 at $1.5B EV; Wynnchurch closed the $450M Arcosa Marine Products acquisition in Q2 2026; and New Mountain rolled Azuria and Inframark into Azuria Water Solutions at $5.5B EV via a continuation vehicle in April 2026, the largest infra-services CV to date.

Platform	Sponsor	2024-2026 activity	Deal ownership contact
Cerberus Maritime	Cerberus Capital Management, New York NY	Launched August 2025 with HD Hyundai and Korea Development Bank; multi-billion-dollar US maritime revitalization mandate	Cerberus Capital Management private equity origination, New York
Saltchuk Resources	Family-owned, Seattle WA	Took Great Lakes Dredge and Dock (NASDAQ: GLDD) private April 2026 at $1.5B EV / $17 per share cash tender	Saltchuk corporate development, Seattle
Wynnchurch Capital	Wynnchurch Capital, Rosemont IL	Acquired Arcosa Marine Products (barge builder) for $450M cash in Q2 2026	Wynnchurch industrials origination, Rosemont
New Mountain Capital / Azuria Water Solutions	New Mountain Capital, New York NY	Rolled Azuria and Inframark into Azuria Water Solutions April 2026 as $5.5B EV continuation vehicle, largest infra-services CV to date	New Mountain infrastructure services team, New York
Geo-Management Construction Partners	Independent sponsor / holdco	Acquired Baltimore Pile Driving and Marine Construction October 2024, terms undisclosed, via Tower Partners	Geo-Management corporate development
Bochi	Investment firm	Acquired Diversified Marine (shipbuilder) 2025, terms undisclosed, per WorkBoat	Bochi principal team

The pattern in this list is that every serious 2024 to 2026 platform buyer combines maritime capability with either a federal contracting thesis or a Jones Act tailwind thesis. Cerberus Maritime is explicitly a US maritime revitalization vehicle. Saltchuk’s GLDD acquisition consolidated the country’s largest dredger under a family-owned maritime holdco that already ran Foss Maritime and Interocean. Wynnchurch bought Arcosa Marine Products because inland barge fleet renewal is running well ahead of Jones Act shipyard capacity. New Mountain’s continuation on Azuria plus Inframark holds water and wastewater infrastructure services, which sit adjacent to marine construction on coastal municipal work.

Behind the four named platforms sit a further 18 to 24 PE-owned platforms with marine construction or marine services as a stated add-on thesis, ranging from lower middle market roll-ups at $2M to $10M EBITDA add-on size up to $50M-plus EBITDA platform tuck-ins. Any well-run process for a $3M-plus EBITDA marine construction seller would surface at least 8 to 12 of those platforms as first-round bidders, with the four named names always in the outreach set.

Who are the strategic acquirers in marine construction M&A?

The four most active strategic acquirers in US marine construction in 2026 are Orion Group Holdings, Great Lakes Dredge and Dock (now Saltchuk-owned), Weeks Marine, and Kiewit Infrastructure, with Manson Construction rounding out the West Coast bidding set. Orion closed the $60M J.E. McAmis and JEM Marine Leasing deal in February 2026 for jetty and breakwater capability plus a $1.4B pipeline, per Orion’s 8-K. Weeks continues to bolt on regional dock and pile crews and would typically pay one to two turns below PE platform multiples.

Strategic buyer behavior in marine construction has three consistent features. First, strategics buy for capability more than for EBITDA multiples. Orion Group did not pay $60M for J.E. McAmis because of trailing EBITDA arithmetic; they paid it for the jetty and breakwater specialty and the $1.4B project pipeline that came with it. Second, strategics pay less in multiple but bring more speed and certainty. A well-known strategic can typically close in 90 to 120 days after LOI where a PE platform’s first-time acquirer would need 150-plus. Third, strategics use less complex consideration, usually cash-plus-note with a small stock component, as Orion’s disclosed $46M cash plus $12M subordinated note plus $2M stock structure demonstrates.

The most useful mental model is to think of strategics as capability-driven and PE as multiple-driven. A seller who owns a rare capability, for example one of the few East Coast contractors with USACE prequalification for large jetty and breakwater work and a Jones Act-compliant crane barge over 250 tons, would typically maximize value with a strategic bidder like Orion or Kiewit. A seller who runs a broadly-capable regional platform at $8M EBITDA with 40% federal exposure would typically maximize value with a PE platform like Cerberus Maritime or Wynnchurch, because the platform underwrites consolidation arbitrage rather than capability scarcity.

Weeks Marine and Manson Construction represent a middle category: family-owned or closely-held strategics that pay strategic-adjacent multiples but underwrite like PE. Both firms have historically closed regional dock and pile crew tuck-ins in the 4x to 6x range on sub-$3M EBITDA targets, and both have shown willingness to preserve founder equity through a defined earnout, which pure strategics like Orion typically would not.

What buyer archetypes are most active in marine construction?

The active buyer archetypes in marine construction in 2026 are (1) named PE platforms with a stated maritime thesis (Cerberus Maritime, Wynnchurch, New Mountain), (2) infrastructure-services roll-ups with adjacent water and dredging portfolios (Saltchuk Resources), (3) public strategic acquirers seeking capability (Orion Group Holdings), (4) family-owned strategics seeking geographic fill (Weeks Marine, Manson Construction), and (5) independent sponsors chasing sub-$3M EBITDA targets with SBA-plus-mezz stacks. Each archetype prices, structures, and closes differently.

Archetype one, the named PE platform, is the highest-multiple buyer in the market but the slowest to close. Cerberus Maritime, Wynnchurch, and New Mountain each run 120 to 180 day processes from LOI, require full QoE and quality-of-management assessments, and expect 15% to 30% rollover from founders. In exchange, they pay 8x to 10x on quality $5M-plus EBITDA books and provide a real second bite at exit five to seven years out. This is the archetype that has generated most of the eight-figure liquidity events for marine construction founders in the 2024 to 2026 window.

Archetype two, the infrastructure-services roll-up, would typically be represented by Saltchuk Resources or by PE-backed adjacent platforms like Azuria Water Solutions. These buyers underwrite marine construction as a bolt-on to a broader thesis and would pay a slight discount to pure-play PE platforms but offer stronger operational integration. They are the natural buyer for a marine construction business with municipal water or wastewater exposure.

Archetype three, the public strategic, is Orion Group Holdings first and Great Lakes Dredge and Dock (Saltchuk) second. Orion’s disclosed 2026 acquisition of J.E. McAmis and JEM Marine Leasing is the textbook comp. Public strategics pay capability-driven multiples, close fast, and use SEC-quality diligence. They are the natural buyer for founders who want speed, certainty, and a clean exit without meaningful rollover.

Archetype four, the family-owned strategic, is Weeks Marine, Manson Construction, and a handful of regional operators. These buyers are more flexible on structure than public strategics, would typically preserve some founder involvement post-close, and pay in the 4x to 6x range for regional tuck-ins. They are the natural buyer for a sub-$3M EBITDA regional shop where the founder wants to stay on for two to three years post-close.

Archetype five, the independent sponsor, targets $500K to $3M EBITDA regional shops with SBA 7(a) plus mezzanine capital stacks. Multiples in this range run 3.5x to 5.5x with meaningful seller notes and earnouts. This is the volume market: dozens of independent sponsors have looked at LMM marine construction in the last 24 months, and the good ones close.

What marine construction value drivers increase the sale multiple?

Value drivers that would push a marine construction multiple to the top of its band include owned crane and pile hammer fleet (avoids rental leakage), USACE and state DOT prequalification held by multiple qualifying individuals, Jones Act-compliant vessels, multi-state marine contractor licenses, in-house engineering and permit expertise, and diversified customer mix across federal, port authority, and private waterfront owners. A business hitting five of these six drivers would typically clear one full turn above the band median at close.

Value driver	Impact on multiple	Why it matters to buyers
Owned crane and pile hammer fleet	+0.5x to +1.0x	Eliminates 8-15% of revenue leaked to rental yards; buyer can flex crews without rental risk
USACE contractor prequalification (multiple qualifiers)	+0.75x to +1.5x	Prequalification does not automatically transfer; multi-qualifier structure protects buyer if seller-QI departs
Jones Act-compliant vessel documentation	+0.25x to +0.75x	Non-compliance is a deal-killer for federal work; audited compliance shortens closing timeline
Multi-state marine contractor licensing (FL, NC, VA)	+0.25x to +0.5x	Each state marine class license takes 12-24 months to obtain; incumbent-held licenses are effectively acquired IP
In-house permitting and engineering	+0.25x to +0.5x	Section 10 and Section 404 permit expertise inside four walls reduces reliance on third-party PEs
Diversified customer mix (fed / port / private)	+0.5x	Single-payer concentration above 40% typically discounts one full turn; diversified book earns full band credit
EMR < 0.85 with three-year history	+0.25x	Table-stakes for federal work; below-industry EMR signals insurance cost tailwind post-close
12+ month bonded backlog	+0.5x	Backlog is buyer’s first-year revenue floor; longer backlog reduces integration risk

Value destroyers move in the same direction but faster. A single-qualifier USACE prequalification held only by the retiring founder would typically discount a deal by one to two full turns because the buyer must underwrite the risk of losing prequalification post-close. Rented crane and pile hammer fleets discount by roughly half a turn because 10% to 15% of revenue disappears into rental invoices that a buyer cannot easily reprice. Undisclosed EPA in-water work window violations or Section 404 permit deficiencies have killed multiple deals in the 2024 to 2026 window outright.

What operational KPIs do marine construction buyers underwrite?

Marine construction buyers in 2026 underwrite backlog months forward, USACE and DOT prequalification renewal dates, revenue per crew-day, equipment utilization percentage, self-perform revenue percentage, warranty and callback reserve as percentage of revenue, and safety EMR (below 1.0 is table-stakes for federal work). PE platforms like Cerberus Maritime would additionally underwrite bonding capacity utilization and the ratio of Jones Act tonnage owned versus chartered.

Backlog months forward is the single most important KPI. A book with 9 to 15 months of bonded backlog at close is the norm for well-run LMM marine construction platforms; less than 6 months would trigger heavy discounting or an earnout structure, and more than 18 months would trigger buyer questions about whether the backlog is real or padded with soft awards. Buyers would typically require sight of every backlog contract at LOI plus a bonding review at exclusivity.

Revenue per crew-day and equipment utilization are the two operational KPIs most closely associated with EBITDA margin. Top-quartile LMM marine construction platforms run $18K to $28K revenue per crew-day depending on job mix, with pile-driving and dock work at the upper end and rip-rap installation at the lower end. Equipment utilization above 75% on owned crane barges and pile hammers is the target; below 60% signals either fleet oversizing or a soft market position that would depress the multiple.

Self-perform revenue percentage matters because it is directly tied to margin durability. A platform that self-performs 70%-plus of revenue would typically defend margin through a soft market, while a platform below 50% self-perform is essentially a subcontractor coordinator and would trade at a materially lower multiple. Warranty and callback reserves at 1.5% to 3.0% of revenue are normal; anything below 1% is undercount risk and anything above 4% signals workmanship issues.

EMR is a hard gate. Federal work requires EMR below 1.0, and most public agency prequalification requires EMR below 0.85 for the top tier of jobs. A seller with EMR above 1.0 would face outright deal-killing risk with a PE platform focused on federal exposure. Buyers would also underwrite the three-year EMR trajectory, not the point-in-time number.

What financial metrics matter most in marine construction M&A?

The financial metrics that drive marine construction valuation are adjusted EBITDA (with owner and one-time add-backs defended), EBITDA margin (top-quartile LMM platforms run 12% to 18%), revenue growth trailing three years, gross profit per crew-day, bonded backlog to revenue ratio, and net working capital seasonality. Buyers underwrite adjusted EBITDA to a QoE-grade normalization; the delta between reported and adjusted EBITDA in LMM marine construction typically runs 15% to 40% and is worth $5M to $30M of enterprise value depending on size.

EBITDA normalization is where most marine construction deals win or lose. Legitimate add-backs commonly include owner compensation above market for a hired GM (typically $150K to $400K per year of add-back on an owner-operator), personal insurance policies run through the business, one-time bid losses on jobs the buyer would not repeat, mobilization and demobilization spikes on federal work that would smooth under new ownership, and start-up costs on new geographies. Each add-back must be defended in QoE with contemporaneous documentation, and each add-back that survives QoE is worth 4x to 8x itself in enterprise value.

EBITDA margin is the second-most-diagnostic metric. Top-quartile LMM marine construction platforms run 12% to 18% EBITDA margin; second-quartile runs 8% to 12%; third-quartile runs 5% to 8%. A platform running 15% margin at $5M EBITDA would trade at the top of the 5.5x to 7.5x band, while a platform running 6% margin at the same EBITDA (implying larger revenue base) would trade at the bottom. Buyers underwrite margin durability across a three-year window, not a point-in-time snapshot.

Revenue growth matters but not linearly. Buyers reward 8% to 15% organic growth over three years but discount growth above 20% as unsustainable or bid-quality-declining. Growth from selective bid margin discipline is worth more than growth from aggressive underbidding. Buyers would typically require a bid win-rate analysis in QoE to confirm the growth is not bought.

How is quality of earnings different for marine construction businesses?

Quality of earnings for marine construction requires vertical-specific normalization that a generalist QoE firm would miss. Percentage-of-completion revenue recognition on public work must be reconciled against actual cost incurred, retainage must be treated separately from AR aging, bonding costs must be normalized to a run-rate assumption, and warranty reserves must be actuarially reviewed against callback history. A QoE that treats a marine construction P&L as a generic construction P&L would misprice EBITDA by 10% to 25%.

The single largest QoE risk area is revenue recognition. Marine construction typically runs percentage-of-completion accounting under ASC 606 (previously ASC 605), and the “cost-to-cost” method used by most LMM shops is highly sensitive to cost estimation accuracy. A QoE provider without construction depth would take the trailing twelve months revenue at face value; a specialist would reconcile revenue against underlying job cost reports, identify projects where costs overran while revenue held constant, and normalize the resulting EBITDA. That normalization has moved reported EBITDA by 10%-plus in multiple CT Acquisitions engagements.

Retainage is the second area. Public work retainage of 5% to 10% is billed at project completion and typically settles 60 to 120 days later. Retainage sitting on the balance sheet is not AR in the working-capital-peg sense; it is a fixed asset for peg purposes. A QoE that folds retainage into working capital would land the seller on a peg $500K to $3M too high, and the seller would surrender that difference at close.

Bonding cost normalization matters because bonding capacity utilization changes with backlog. A seller who is bond-constrained today would show bonding cost at, for example, 0.75% of revenue; a buyer who assumes bonding cost at 1.5% because their bonding line is thinner would price EBITDA down accordingly. A well-run QoE would normalize bonding to a run-rate assumption based on the acquirer’s own bonding line rather than the seller’s.

Warranty and callback reserves are the fourth area. Marine construction warranty exposure is real: pile-driving callbacks, dock plank rot, and sheet pile displacement all generate callback costs 12 to 60 months post-completion. A QoE that undercounts warranty reserve would inflate EBITDA in the short run, but a sophisticated buyer would rebuild the reserve during exclusivity and repress the number, forcing a price adjustment. Advisors who preflight the reserve honestly in the CIM avoid that adjustment.

What working capital and CapEx nuances affect marine construction valuations?

Marine construction working capital pegs typically land at 45 to 75 days of revenue with retainage carved out separately. Progress billing on public work stretches to 90-120 days, and heavy equipment (crane barges $1M to $5M each, pile hammers $500K to $2M each, spuds and tugs $250K to $1.5M each) must be treated as fixed asset rather than working capital. Bonding capacity often caps growth before capital does, which sophisticated buyers would price into their post-close capital plan.

The working capital peg negotiation is where good advisors save sellers seven figures. A generalist peg would take trailing twelve months average working capital as the target; a specialist would carve out retainage, exclude vessel-related inventory, normalize progress billing seasonality, and land on a target that reflects steady-state operating capital only. On a $30M enterprise value deal, that carve-out routinely preserves $2M to $4M of cash at close for the seller.

CapEx normalization is the second area. Marine construction is heavy equipment intensive: a full LMM platform would run $8M to $25M of gross fleet at any given time, with maintenance CapEx of 6% to 10% of revenue and growth CapEx variable. Buyers would typically underwrite maintenance CapEx at 8% and treat growth CapEx as sponsor-funded. Sellers whose recent CapEx spike reflects growth investment (a new crane barge added Year -1) would negotiate for that CapEx to be treated as one-time in the trailing EBITDA normalization.

Bonding capacity is a shadow constraint. Most LMM marine construction platforms operate at 60% to 80% bonding line utilization; a buyer who inherits an 85%-plus utilized line would need to expand the line immediately post-close, which typically requires a personal guarantee replacement and reunderwriting. A seller who has proactively pre-cleared bonding line expansion with the surety before going to market accelerates close by 30 to 60 days and preserves optionality on which buyer to accept.

What regulatory or licensing issues affect marine construction M&A?

Regulatory issues that affect marine construction M&A include US Army Corps of Engineers Section 10 and Section 404 permits, state coastal zone management approvals, Jones Act vessel compliance, USACE contractor prequalification for waterway work, state marine contractor licensing (Florida, North Carolina, and Virginia all require separate marine class), OSHA marine construction standard 1926 Subpart P, and EPA in-water work windows tied to fish migration. A specialist advisor pre-inspects each and remediates before marketing rather than surfacing issues at exclusivity.

USACE contractor prequalification is the highest-value regulatory asset in a marine construction business and the highest-risk transfer at close. Prequalification is held by the corporate entity but qualified by named individuals inside the company; if the qualifying individual departs before or shortly after close, the prequalification can lapse. Best practice is to have prequalification qualified by two or three individuals before going to market and to retain the founder as a consultant qualifying individual for 12 to 24 months post-close.

Section 404 permits (wetlands and waters of the US) are the highest-risk item in due diligence. Every open marine construction job with in-water work requires an active Section 404 nationwide or individual permit, and permit violations, even historical ones, are strict-liability under the Clean Water Act. A specialist advisor commissions an environmental permit review as part of preparation and remediates any open violations before the buyer’s environmental counsel finds them. Undisclosed Section 404 violations are the single most common LOI-to-close kill in this vertical.

State marine contractor licensing is a gating item in Florida, North Carolina, and Virginia and to lesser degrees in South Carolina, Georgia, and Louisiana. Each state license takes 12 to 24 months to obtain from scratch, and licenses do not transfer with an asset sale by default. Stock sales preserve licensing, but Florida’s contractor licensing statute has specific change-of-control notification requirements that must be filed pre-close.

Jones Act vessel compliance is a binary requirement for federal waterway work. Every vessel used on Jones Act work must be US-flagged, US-crewed, US-owned, and US-built. A seller with a documented and audited Jones Act compliance file preserves value; a seller who has been running a chartered non-compliant vessel on federal work faces both deal risk and potential Coast Guard exposure. Specialist advisors commission a Jones Act audit in preparation.

How long does a marine construction business sale take from LOI to close?

A well-run marine construction sale takes 7 to 10 months from engagement to close and 90 to 150 days from signed LOI to close. Preparation and QoE runs 6 to 10 weeks, teaser plus CIM 3 to 4 weeks, buyer outreach and first-round LOIs 8 to 12 weeks, best-and-final plus signed LOI 3 to 5 weeks, and exclusivity through close 10 to 14 weeks. USACE prequalification transfer, bonding line assumption, and Jones Act vessel documentation are the timeline risks that extend deals past the 10-month mark.

The preparation phase is where advisors typically underinvest. A specialist marine construction advisor would spend 6 to 10 weeks on preparation before the first buyer sees the teaser, which includes QoE fieldwork, permit review, Jones Act audit, bonding line preflight, EMR reconciliation, and CIM drafting. Sellers who rush preparation typically add 60 to 90 days back on the far end because issues surface in exclusivity rather than being remediated pre-market.

Marketing and outreach takes 8 to 12 weeks. First-round teasers land within 5 to 7 days of launch, NDAs and CIM distribution within 2 weeks, management presentations 4 to 6 weeks in, and first-round LOIs 8 to 10 weeks in. A well-curated buyer list of 40 to 60 names would typically yield 8 to 15 indications of interest and 4 to 8 LOIs within the first round.

Exclusivity to close runs 10 to 14 weeks on a marine construction deal. Confirmatory QoE and legal diligence run 6 to 8 weeks in parallel, environmental permit and Jones Act diligence run 4 to 6 weeks, definitive documents run 4 to 8 weeks, and closing conditions (bonding line assumption, prequalification transfer notification, state licensing filings) run 2 to 6 weeks. Deals that miss the 14-week window typically miss because a permit or prequalification issue was not remediated in preparation.

What fees does a marine construction M&A advisor charge?

Marine construction M&A advisors typically charge a modified Lehman success fee (5-4-3-2-1% on the first $5M of consideration, tapering to 1.5% to 3% on deals above $10M) plus a monthly retainer of $10K to $25K that would be credited against success at close. Minimum success fees run $150K to $300K. Buy-side fee structures are separate and typically combine a lower monthly retainer with a per-close success fee. Full LMM investment bank fees for lower middle market deals are broken down in detail on our sister guide.

Advisor tier	Typical deal size	Success fee	Retainer	Timeline
Boutique / LMM specialist (CT Acquisitions tier)	$5M-$75M EV	Modified Lehman 5-4-3-2-1% + 1.5-2% tail; min $150K-$300K	$10K-$25K/mo credited to success	7-10 months engagement to close
Regional investment bank	$25M-$200M EV	1.5-3% flat above $25M; step-down schedule below	$25K-$50K/mo, sometimes non-credited	8-12 months engagement to close
Bulge-bracket / global IB	$200M+ EV	0.75-1.5% flat + incentive kicker above bogey price	$100K+/mo work fee	9-14 months engagement to close

Fee structures matter less than fee-to-value delivered. A specialist advisor charging a $250K success fee on a $30M deal (0.83%) who preserves $3M of value in working capital peg negotiation, defends $500K of EBITDA add-backs, and drives the multiple from 6.0x to 6.5x through competitive tension has delivered value roughly 20x their fee. A generic advisor charging 2% on the same deal ($600K) who leaves each of those value pockets on the table has cost the seller net $2M-plus in a fee-adjusted comparison. Fees are the wrong first question.

What red flags kill marine construction deals in due diligence?

The most common LOI-to-close kills in marine construction due diligence are undisclosed Section 404 permit violations, single-qualifier USACE prequalification with founder as sole qualifier, Jones Act vessel non-compliance on federal work, EMR above 1.0 with federal contract exposure, undocumented change-order approvals on federal projects, working capital pegs that ignore retainage timing, and warranty reserves that undercount pile-driving callback risk. A specialist advisor pre-inspects each and remediates in preparation rather than negotiating around them at exclusivity.

Section 404 permit violations are the single most common kill. The Clean Water Act imposes strict liability for wetlands or waters of the US work performed without or in violation of a Section 404 permit, and the liability follows the corporate entity in a stock sale. Buyers with sophisticated environmental counsel would walk from any deal with unremediated Section 404 exposure. Preparation-phase environmental review catches almost all of these issues; exclusivity-phase discovery kills the deal or repriced it by 20%-plus.

Single-qualifier USACE prequalification is the second-most-common issue. Where the founder is the sole qualifying individual on federal prequalification, the buyer must underwrite the risk that founder departure would trigger prequalification loss, which would collapse the federal-book EBITDA basis. Adding a second and third qualifying individual pre-market solves the problem in 90 to 180 days; running to market without solving it costs 0.5 to 1.5 turns of multiple.

Jones Act vessel non-compliance surfaces in almost every deal where the seller has operated on federal waterway work with chartered vessels. Documentation that the vessel is US-flagged, US-crewed, US-owned, and US-built is required, and the compliance file must be complete and auditable. Sellers with clean Jones Act files close faster and at higher multiples; sellers whose fleet includes a non-compliant chartered vessel face restructuring or asset exclusion negotiations.

EMR above 1.0 blocks federal work at most contracting officers and blocks most tier-one state DOT prequalifications. A seller with 1.0-plus EMR walking into a marketing process against buyers with federal theses would face outright rejection from Cerberus Maritime, Wynnchurch, and similar buyers. Best practice is to address EMR drivers 18 to 24 months before going to market.

Undocumented change-order approvals on federal work are the fifth killer. Federal contracts under FAR Part 43 require documented, signed change orders for any modification to scope or price. Sellers who have been performing on informal change orders face contract disallowance risk, and the risk transfers with the entity. A specialist advisor commissions a federal contract compliance review in preparation.

How CT Acquisitions works with marine construction business sellers

CT Acquisitions runs a full sell-side sale process for lower middle market marine construction owners with $1M to $25M of EBITDA. Engagements begin with a two-week free assessment covering EBITDA normalization preview, buyer universe scan against the four named 2026 platforms (Cerberus Maritime, Saltchuk, Wynnchurch, New Mountain), and a preliminary valuation range. Full engagement includes QoE coordination, CIM drafting, targeted outreach, LOI negotiation, and closing coordination through USACE prequalification transfer and bonding line assumption.

The CT Acquisitions sell-side engagement runs in four phases. Phase one is preparation and lasts 6 to 10 weeks. This includes engaging a construction-specialist QoE firm, commissioning environmental permit and Jones Act audits, reviewing bonding capacity and preflighting line expansion with the surety, and drafting the CIM. Preparation-phase work is where the difference between an average and a strong outcome is made; most of the eight-figure value swings in a marine construction sale happen here rather than at LOI negotiation.

Phase two is marketing and lasts 3 to 4 weeks from CIM completion to first-round LOIs. CT would typically outreach a curated buyer list of 40 to 60 names including all four named PE platforms above, 8 to 12 PE-backed marine and infrastructure platforms with disclosed marine add-on theses, 4 to 6 public and private strategics (Orion, GLDD, Weeks, Manson, Kiewit), and 10 to 15 independent sponsors sized for the deal. Outreach is founder-to-founder or partner-to-CEO, not blast email.

Phase three is LOI negotiation and lasts 3 to 5 weeks. CT would run first-round management presentations with 8 to 12 buyers, second-round with 4 to 6, and final LOI negotiation with the top 2 to 3. Best-and-final terms are typically driven not by headline price alone but by structure (cash percentage, rollover, earnout, working capital peg), timeline certainty, and cultural fit. A well-run LOI phase generates two turns of competitive tension between the top two buyers.

Phase four is exclusivity through close and lasts 10 to 14 weeks. CT coordinates confirmatory QoE, environmental and Jones Act diligence, definitive documents, bonding line assumption, and prequalification transfer. The founder’s job during this phase is to keep operating the business at plan; CT’s job is to hold the buyer to the LOI terms and drive the calendar. Deals close on time when preparation was done properly; deals slip when preparation was rushed.

How CT Acquisitions works with marine construction business buyers

CT Acquisitions runs buy-side searches for PE platforms adding marine construction and for strategic acquirers seeking geographic or capability tuck-ins. Engagements begin with a thesis workshop, then move to target list construction cross-referenced against USACE prequalification and state marine contractor license databases, founder outreach, LOI negotiation, and coordination with the acquirer’s QoE, environmental, legal, and bonding review teams. Typical buy-side engagement scope is 12 to 20 qualified leads per quarter under thesis.

Buy-side clients fall into three categories. The first is PE platforms with an existing marine construction or maritime services investment (for example a Cerberus Maritime-style platform or a portfolio company of Wynnchurch, New Mountain, or an adjacent industrials sponsor) hunting add-ons at $1M to $10M EBITDA. The second is strategic acquirers (public or private) looking for geographic fill, capability expansion, or license acquisition (an Orion Group-style tuck-in of J.E. McAmis-scale targets). The third is independent sponsors or family offices with committed capital chasing a first platform investment in marine construction.

Target list construction is where a specialist buy-side advisor earns their fee. CT maintains a proprietary database of roughly 2,400 US marine contractors cross-referenced against USACE contractor prequalification lists, state marine class license registries in Florida, North Carolina, and Virginia, and bonded backlog filings. Targets are scored on capability fit, geographic fit, ownership stage (aging founder, prior PE interest, family succession stress), and financial profile inference from public data. A typical target list under a thesis scope contains 80 to 200 businesses, refined weekly with the client.

Outreach on buy-side is high-touch and takes months. CT runs founder-to-founder outreach on behalf of PE clients where the sponsor’s partner or an operator would make the initial call. On behalf of strategic clients, outreach is CEO-to-CEO or CT-to-CEO with the strategic disclosed. The goal is 15% to 25% response rate on cold outreach, 5% to 10% deep engagement, and 2% to 4% LOI-signable over a 6 to 12 month campaign. Under thesis scope, that yields 12 to 20 qualified leads per quarter.

Post-LOI, CT coordinates the acquirer’s diligence workstream: QoE firm selection, environmental counsel, Jones Act audit provider, bonding line preflight with the acquirer’s surety, and definitive document negotiation. Buy-side clients would typically retain CT through close and often into the first 90 days post-close for integration coordination. CT’s buy-side approach is described in detail on our PE add-on buy-side advisor page and strategic acquirer buy-side page.

How does CT Acquisitions source proprietary marine construction deal flow for buyers?

CT Acquisitions sources proprietary marine construction deal flow from a curated database of roughly 2,400 US marine contractors cross-referenced against USACE contractor prequalification lists, state marine class license registries (Florida, North Carolina, Virginia), and bonded backlog filings. Owners are contacted individually via founder-to-founder outreach rather than blast email, and buy-side clients see 12 to 20 qualified leads per quarter under thesis scope. Proprietary deal flow is the difference between paying full auction price and closing at the sourced-deal discount.

The database is the foundation. CT’s marine construction target universe of approximately 2,400 US contractors is refreshed quarterly against USACE prequalification updates, state license renewals, and D&B financial data. Each target carries a data record covering estimated revenue and EBITDA, prequalification status, license portfolio, ownership tenure, aging signals, prior transaction history (both closed and rumored), and known capability specialties. That data density lets us score fit rapidly against any incoming buy-side thesis.

Outreach cadence matters. Cold outreach in marine construction has a low response rate if done poorly and a strong response rate if done right. CT’s outreach uses founder-referenced or partner-referenced approaches wherever possible and cold-to-CEO only where warm intros do not exist. Response rates under this approach run 15% to 25% at first touch and 30% to 45% over three touches, well above the 3% to 8% typical of generic BD outreach.

The sourced-deal discount matters most. Deals that CT surfaces proprietarily and closes before the seller goes to a broader auction typically close at 0.5 to 1.5 turns of EBITDA below what the same seller would receive in a full auction. That discount reflects the seller’s preference for certainty, speed, and cultural fit over price-maximization. For a buy-side client, sourcing three or four proprietary deals per year at 1x below auction pricing on $5M-plus EBITDA targets is worth $2.5M to $30M of aggregate value per year.

How do you interview and select a marine construction M&A advisor?

Interview at least three advisors and score them on vertical experience (named marine construction deals closed in the last 24 months), buyer universe knowledge (can they name Cerberus Maritime’s launch date, Saltchuk’s GLDD tender price, and Wynnchurch’s Arcosa Marine Products consideration off the top of their head?), fee structure transparency, references from recent marine construction sellers, and CIM samples redacted from prior deals. The interview is where you find out whether the advisor knows this vertical or is guessing.

The single best interview question is “walk me through your last three marine construction deals.” A specialist advisor would be able to name the buyers, describe the structure, explain the EBITDA normalization approach used, and describe one thing they would do differently. A generalist would either not have three marine construction deals in the last 24 months or would answer in generic construction-industry language. The specificity of the answer separates specialists from generalists faster than any other single question.

Buyer universe knowledge is the second-best test. Ask the advisor to name the five most active PE platforms in marine construction in 2026 with sponsor names and last major deal. The specialist answer would include Cerberus Maritime (Cerberus Capital Management, launched August 2025), Saltchuk Resources (family-owned, GLDD take-private April 2026 at $1.5B EV), Wynnchurch Capital (Rosemont IL, Arcosa Marine Products $450M Q2 2026), and New Mountain Capital (Azuria Water Solutions $5.5B CV April 2026). A generalist would name generic PE firms with no marine-specific activity.

Fee structure transparency is the third test. A specialist would walk you through their success fee schedule in detail, tell you what their retainer credits against, describe minimum fees, and give you a written engagement letter to review. A generalist would ask for a signed engagement letter before discussing fees in detail, which is a red flag.

References are the fourth test. Ask for two seller references from marine construction deals closed in the last 18 months. Call the references and ask three questions: was the closing price within the advisor’s stated range at engagement? Did the advisor manage the process or did the seller? Would the reference hire the advisor again? A specialist would have willing references and confident answers; a generalist would evade the request.

What questions should you ask before signing an engagement letter?

Before signing an M&A engagement letter for a marine construction sale, ask (1) what is the exact success fee schedule with dollar examples at three price points, (2) what is the retainer and does it credit against success, (3) what is the tail period and coverage, (4) who specifically will run my deal (partner vs analyst), (5) what is the buyer universe you would target, (6) what is your valuation range and what assumptions underlie it, (7) what is the timeline expectation, and (8) what QoE firm do you recommend and why. Specialist answers to each question separate signal from noise.

Question one, the fee schedule, matters because ambiguity in the engagement letter becomes friction at close. Ask for a written schedule with dollar examples at your expected price point, the price point above (best case), and the price point below (worst case). A specialist provides all three in writing before you sign.

Question two, retainer treatment, matters because $10K to $25K per month over 8 to 10 months is $80K to $250K of pre-close expense. Retainer credited against success at close is the norm for LMM specialists; non-credited retainer is a signal of a larger IB structure that would only be appropriate on a $100M-plus deal.

Question three, the tail period, is where sellers most commonly get surprised. Standard tail is 12 to 24 months post-engagement termination and covers any buyer introduced during the engagement. A tail longer than 24 months or covering buyers not introduced by the advisor is a red flag.

Question four, who runs the deal, matters because advisor firms sometimes sell partner attention and deliver analyst execution. Ask for the specific individual who will be on your weekly call, the specific individual who will attend management presentations, and the specific individual who will negotiate LOI terms. All three should be the same person or a two-person team, and one should be a partner or director.

Question five, the buyer universe, is the specialist test. A specialist marine construction advisor would produce a target list of 40 to 60 names in the first meeting with named PE platforms, named strategics, and named independent sponsors. A generalist would say “we would develop the list during preparation,” which is a signal they do not have one.

Question six, valuation range and assumptions, matters because sellers should not sign with an advisor whose range is materially different from realistic. Ask what trailing twelve months EBITDA the advisor is assuming, what add-backs they would defend, what multiple range they would target, and what precedent transactions they would cite. A specialist cites Orion / J.E. McAmis, Wynnchurch / Arcosa Marine Products, Saltchuk / GLDD; a generalist cites generic construction transactions.

Question seven, timeline, matters because most sellers underestimate. Ask the advisor for a specific week-by-week timeline from engagement through close, with milestones. Specialist timelines land at 30 to 40 weeks; generalist timelines are hand-wavy.

Question eight, the QoE firm, matters because a construction-generalist QoE would misprice a marine construction P&L by 10% to 25%. A specialist advisor would recommend a QoE firm with named marine construction or heavy civil construction experience and would coordinate the QoE workstream inside the engagement.

What is the buy-side thesis case for marine construction in 2026?

The 2026 buy-side thesis for marine construction rests on four tailwinds: (1) federal infrastructure spending on ports, jetties, and coastal resilience under IIJA and Water Resources Development Act reauthorization, (2) Jones Act shipbuilding and marine services tailwind extending into inland waterway barge fleet renewal, (3) consolidation arbitrage in a fragmented market of roughly 2,400 US marine contractors, and (4) PE dry powder chasing infrastructure services yield in a rate environment favoring cash-yielding platforms. Cerberus Maritime’s August 2025 launch is the most explicit expression of this thesis.

The federal infrastructure tailwind is durable through at least the end of the current WRDA authorization cycle. Corps of Engineers civil works appropriations have run above $9B per year for the last three fiscal years, with a substantial portion flowing to coastal resilience, jetty and breakwater work, and inland waterway lock and dam projects. Marine construction platforms with USACE prequalification and Jones Act tonnage capture disproportionate share of that spend.

The Jones Act tailwind is separate and equally durable. Inland waterway barge fleet renewal has been running well ahead of Jones Act shipyard capacity for several years, and the Wynnchurch $450M Arcosa Marine Products acquisition in Q1 2026 was explicit expression of the barge-renewal thesis. Adjacent to the shipyard thesis, marine construction platforms with owned Jones Act-compliant crane barges and pile hammers have pricing power on any federally-funded work.

Consolidation arbitrage is the third leg. The US marine construction market contains roughly 2,400 contractors, of which perhaps 800 have any meaningful federal exposure and perhaps 200 are LMM-scale platforms attractive to institutional capital. That fragmentation supports both platform investing and add-on programs; a PE platform buying at 6x EBITDA and rolling up add-ons at 4.5x EBITDA generates multiple arbitrage on top of any operational improvement.

PE dry powder chasing infrastructure services is the fourth leg. Global infrastructure fund dry powder has exceeded $400B for multiple years, and the shift from pure infrastructure assets (toll roads, utilities) to infrastructure services (construction, environmental, water) has accelerated. Marine construction sits squarely in the infrastructure services bucket that mid-cap and mega-cap PE has been actively deploying into.

What are the recent marine construction transactions in 2024-2026?

Recent marine construction and adjacent marine services transactions from 2024 to 2026 include Saltchuk / Great Lakes Dredge and Dock ($1.5B EV, April 2026), Wynnchurch / Arcosa Marine Products ($450M cash, Q1 2026), New Mountain / Azuria + Inframark ($5.5B EV continuation vehicle, April 2026), Orion Group / J.E. McAmis + JEM Marine Leasing ($60M, February 2026), Cerberus Maritime launch with HD Hyundai and KDB (August 2025), Bochi / Diversified Marine (2025), and Geo-Management Construction Partners / Baltimore Pile Driving and Marine Construction (October 2024). Each is a real deal with disclosable comps.

Date	Buyer	Target	Consideration	Source
April 2026	Saltchuk Resources	Great Lakes Dredge and Dock (NASDAQ: GLDD)	$1.5B EV / $17 per share cash tender / ~$1.2B equity	GLDD proxy and Saltchuk announcement
April 2026	New Mountain Capital	Azuria Water Solutions (Azuria + Inframark roll-up)	$5.5B EV continuation vehicle, largest infra-services CV to date	New Mountain press release
Q2 2026	Wynnchurch Capital	Arcosa Marine Products (barge builder)	$450M cash	Arcosa 8-K, WorkBoat
February 2026	Orion Group Holdings (NYSE: ORN)	J.E. McAmis + JEM Marine Leasing	~$60M ($46M cash + $12M sub note + $2M stock + earnouts)	Orion Group 8-K
August 2025	Cerberus Capital Management (launch)	Cerberus Maritime (platform launch with HD Hyundai + KDB)	Multi-billion-dollar US maritime revitalization mandate	Cerberus Capital announcement
2025	Bochi (investment firm)	Diversified Marine (shipbuilder)	Terms undisclosed	WorkBoat
October 2024	Geo-Management Construction Partners	Baltimore Pile Driving and Marine Construction	Terms undisclosed (Tower Partners advised)	Tower Partners advisory release

The pattern in this deal set is clear. Large-scale platform transactions (GLDD, Azuria, Cerberus Maritime launch, Arcosa Marine Products) print at the top of the market with multi-billion or high-hundreds-of-millions consideration. Strategic tuck-ins (Orion / J.E. McAmis) print at $50M to $75M with mixed cash-note-stock consideration. Independent sponsor and single-family holdco transactions (Bochi / Diversified Marine, Geo-Management / Baltimore Pile Driving) print at undisclosed terms typically in the $10M to $40M range. The full spectrum of exit paths is active in 2026, which is what makes this an unusually strong seller’s market.

How CT Acquisitions compares to boutique, regional, and bulge-bracket advisors

CT Acquisitions sits in the boutique LMM specialist tier, best suited for marine construction deals with $5M to $75M enterprise value. Regional investment banks are appropriate for $25M to $200M deals but typically charge higher retainers with lower vertical specialization. Bulge-bracket banks fit $200M-plus deals only. For most LMM marine construction owners the fit is a boutique specialist with named vertical experience; a fuller comparison lives on our lower middle market M&A advisor guide.

The choice between boutique and regional IB is often overstated. A specialist boutique with a named vertical practice would typically outperform a generalist regional IB on any LMM marine construction deal below $75M enterprise value, because the specialist would have the buyer relationships, the vertical KPIs at their fingertips, and the QoE coordination playbook. A regional IB would outperform on deals above $75M where the added weight of a larger platform matters more than vertical specialization. Bulge-bracket banks are appropriate only above $200M and typically not the right fit for LMM founder-owned businesses at all.

The other real dimension of choice is culture and communication. LMM founders would typically be poorly served by a bulge-bracket structure where partner attention is diluted across many mandates and analyst execution dominates. A boutique specialist would deliver partner attention weekly, with the founder having the direct cell phone of the advisor running the deal. That structural difference in communication density is often more valuable than any fee or multiple comparison.

Frequently asked questions

How does CT Acquisitions think about seller-financed notes and earnouts in marine construction?

Seller notes typically run 5% to 15% of consideration in LMM marine construction deals, structured as 3 to 7 year subordinated notes at market rate plus 100 to 300 basis points. Earnouts of 5% to 20% of consideration are common where trailing EBITDA is volatile or where federal backlog conversion is a material assumption; they would typically be structured over 12 to 36 months with clear achievement metrics and a floor at 50% payment. Orion Group’s disclosed $12M subordinated note on the $60M J.E. McAmis deal is a textbook LMM structure.

What size of marine construction business does CT Acquisitions typically represent?

CT Acquisitions typically represents marine construction businesses with $1M to $25M of adjusted EBITDA, corresponding to $5M to $200M of enterprise value depending on multiple. Below $1M EBITDA the deal is typically better served by a business broker or SBA-focused firm; above $25M EBITDA the deal can accommodate either CT or a regional IB depending on complexity.

Does CT Acquisitions represent both sellers and buyers on the same deal?

No. CT Acquisitions represents either the seller or the buyer on a given transaction, never both. Dual representation creates conflicts of interest that would compromise our ability to negotiate on behalf of either principal. On buy-side engagements we contact sellers directly with disclosure that we represent a specific buyer.

What geographic markets does CT Acquisitions cover for marine construction?

CT covers all US marine construction markets including the Gulf Coast (Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida), the Atlantic Coast (Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Maine), the Pacific Coast (California, Oregon, Washington), the Great Lakes states, and the inland waterway systems (Mississippi River, Ohio River, Missouri River). Cross-border Canadian and Mexican transactions are handled selectively.

How does CT Acquisitions coordinate with the seller’s existing CPA, attorney, and bonding agent?

CT works alongside the seller’s existing advisors rather than replacing them. The CPA typically continues to handle tax planning and year-end financials while CT coordinates the QoE workstream with a specialist QoE provider. The attorney handles definitive document drafting and negotiation on the seller’s side. The bonding agent handles surety line preflight and assumption coordination. CT’s role is to quarterback the process and ensure each advisor is engaged at the right point in the timeline.

What happens if the seller wants to stay on post-close?

Post-close founder retention is negotiable and depends on the buyer archetype. PE platforms would typically want the founder for 12 to 36 months as a strategic advisor or minority-equity CEO with rollover equity. Strategic acquirers would typically want the founder for 6 to 24 months as a transition consultant. Both structures are common in marine construction because operational knowledge and permit and prequalification relationships require handoff time. CT negotiates the retention terms as part of the LOI structure rather than as an afterthought.

How confidential is the process?

Sell-side processes at CT run under strict confidentiality. Employee and customer notification typically happens at signed LOI or later depending on the deal, and the buyer list is scrubbed for any competitor or customer that might create disclosure risk if they saw the CIM. NDAs are signed before any information beyond the teaser leaves the deal room. In the 2024 to 2026 window, CT has completed multiple marine construction transactions without pre-close employee or customer awareness of the process.

Does CT handle deals where the buyer is a foreign strategic or foreign PE?

Yes, with CFIUS coordination. Marine construction with federal exposure would trigger CFIUS review on any foreign buyer transaction, and CT coordinates with CFIUS counsel from the LOI stage forward. The Cerberus Maritime launch with HD Hyundai (Korean) and Korea Development Bank as partners is a template for how foreign strategic capital can be structured to clear CFIUS on maritime assets.

What is the CT Acquisitions two-week free assessment?

The free assessment is a two-week engagement offered to serious sellers considering a sale in the next 6 to 18 months. It includes an EBITDA normalization preview against the seller’s trailing twelve months P&L, a buyer universe scan against current market activity, a preliminary valuation range with supporting comps, and a recommended timeline to sale. There is no fee and no obligation to engage; roughly two-thirds of assessment recipients engage CT for the full sale within 12 months.

Related M&A advisor resources

For related M&A advisory content, see our M&A advisory pillar hub, our buy-side M&A advisory guide, our lower middle market M&A advisor guide, our 2026 business appraisal cost guide, our investment bank fees LMM 2026 guide, our quality of earnings 2026 guide, and our sell your marine construction business sub-hub. See also our vertical-adjacent guides on heavy civil construction M&A, dredging M&A, and pile driving M&A. Buy-side archetype specifics are covered in our PE add-on buy-side page and strategic acquirer buy-side page.

Sources cited inline throughout this guide include the Orion Group Holdings 8-K for the J.E. McAmis and JEM Marine Leasing transaction, the Great Lakes Dredge and Dock proxy for the Saltchuk take-private, the Arcosa 8-K for the Wynnchurch acquisition, the New Mountain Capital press release for the Azuria Water Solutions continuation vehicle, the Cerberus Capital Management announcement for the Cerberus Maritime launch, WorkBoat for the Bochi / Diversified Marine and Wynnchurch / Arcosa coverage, Tower Partners for the Geo-Management / Baltimore Pile Driving advisory release, Capstone Partners August 2025 construction services report for PE-paid vs strategic-paid multiple benchmarks, GF Data for LMM multiple benchmarks, Axial for LMM deal flow data, PitchBook for PE platform data, the US Army Corps of Engineers for prequalification and permit context, the US Coast Guard for Jones Act vessel documentation guidance, Bain and PwC for infrastructure services M&A benchmarks, the Dredging Contractors of America trade association, and the EPA Section 404 program for wetlands permitting context. Additional sources referenced include the Saltchuk Resources corporate site for the GLDD tender structure, Wynnchurch Capital for the Arcosa Marine Products acquisition rationale, OSHA marine construction standard 1926 Subpart P for safety compliance context, FASAB and ASC 606 guidance for percentage-of-completion revenue recognition, and the US Treasury CFIUS program for foreign-buyer review context on marine and maritime transactions.